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DISCOVERY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
ARE WE NUTS?
Stephen N. Subrin*
The idea that we, in the United States, are in some ways nuts is not
a new one for me. When my wife and I visit Europe, I often come
home thinking that somehow we have it wrong; that perhaps the
Europeans have a wiser sense of proportion and priorities. When we
visited relatives in Scotland, I admired the small size of the refrigera-
tors. We went to the neighborhood grocery store more frequently and
purchased only what was needed for the next day or so. There was
less waste. So much more public money was spent on shared space
such as the parks, plazas, and museums in France and Italy. In
London, Paris, and Florence one finds pubs or cafes where lunch and
a post-work ale, wine, or coffee with friends are daily rituals. I know
that vacations are not the best time for objective research. Yet, I see
merit in the sensibilities that less can be better than more, that public
expenditures for the community at large are not inherently misguided,
and that one's profession need not devour one's humanity. Although
my vacation musings do not provide a perfect match, they touch on
some of the issues raised in comparing discovery in civil cases in the
United States with that of the rest of the world. Is more better? How
should lawyers spend their time? What is the appropriate relationship
between private and public expenditures in law enforcement? Are we
in fact nuts in our approach to discovery?
To call someone or something "nuts" has at least three different
meanings. When someone says, "I am nuts over you," it denotes an
intense attraction, although, as in love, there may also be a bit of am-
bivalence. In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) Litigation
Section magazine was devoted to "Discovery." The introduction
began:
Most cases settle, and victory is not in the scathing cross, but in the
tedious review of documents. Success is in the details, the expertly
drafted interrogatories or request for records, and in the ingenious
strategy to obtain the statement allegedly protected by privilege.
For it is Discovery which we do. The motions, the papers, the depo-
* Professor, University of Northeastern School of Law. I thank my students, Keren Golden-
berg and Darrin Goldin. for their able research.
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sitions. This is the numbing, ditch digging work that determines the
winner . .. .
Twelve of the eighty-six Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal with
discovery. I suspect that for full time litigators these rules, as well as
state and local rules dealing with discovery, are among the most uti-
lized on a day-to-day basis. In 1998, the chairperson of the Federal
Civil Rules Advisory Committee convened a conference on discovery.
His conclusions are, I believe, a fair summary of how American law-
yers view discovery, as well as an accurate description of the results of
empirical studies:
1. The desire for information in connection with the resolution of
civil disputes was nearly universal. No one at the Conference
seemed to advocate the elimination of requiring full disclosure of
relevant information.
2. Discovery is now working effectively and efficiently in a majority
of cases, which represent "routine" cases.
3. In cases where discovery was actively used, it was thought to be
unnecessarily expensive and burdensome .... 2
When one is called "nuts," it can also mean one is acting in an unu-
sual way, different from the way that others act. From a comparative
law perspective, we really are different in our approach to discovery.
I have written elsewhere how, during the drafting of the Federal Rules
between 1935 to 1937, the Advisory Committee turned away from
what had been quite limited discovery in federal court and in most
state courts and embraced virtually every known discovery method:
interrogatories, oral depositions, written depositions, document re-
quests, physical and mental examinations, inspection of property, and
requests for admissions.3 For Edson Sunderland, the main draftsman
of this portion of the rules, there was no bad discovery borscht. More
was better. We went from discovery fishing expeditions as an evil to
discovery fishing as a good, a needed complement to notice pleading.
Recall the words of Hickman v. Taylor:4
[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and lib-
eral treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing ex-
pedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the rele-
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.5
1. Discovery, 1997 A.B.A. SEc. LIM,,. 23.
2. Paul V. Niemeyer. Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 523 (1998).
3. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 729 (1998).
4. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
5. Id. at 507.
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Complete discovery would, it was argued, eliminate surprise, lead to
enlightened settlements, and when necessary, facilitate more focused
and efficient trials.
It is not as if most of us, whether lawyers, judges, law professors, or
clients, are sure that we have gotten it right. The rapid pace of
amendments to the federal discovery rules has brought expanded case
management, discovery conferences, pretrial conferences, required at-
torney consultations, more stringent certification, numeric discovery
limits, the concept of proportionality, mandatory disclosure, a redefi-
nition of "scope, ' ' 6 and has pointed to our own skepticism. This skep-
ticism has to be heightened when one looks at civil discovery in the
rest of the world, where civilizations seemed to have survived quite
well without American discovery.7
In comparing American civil discovery with that in the rest of the
world, it is traditional to look at other common law countries, particu-
larly England, and at civil law countries such as France, Italy, and
Germany. One then considers Japan, since its place in the world econ-
omy is so central. Let me summarize quickly what I have gleaned
from the literature, although I am fully aware of the dangers of mis-
representation when foreigners attempt to describe the procedures
used in other countries. What actually happens in litigation is often a
faint, distorted shadow of what appears in the rules or the academic
literature.
That said, it does seem true that two of the biggest differences be-
tween civil law countries and the United States with respect to pretrial
discovery are the centrality of the judge in civilian civil litigation and
the continuity of the proceedings. We are accustomed to lawyers con-
ducting pretrial discovery, supervised in a general way by judges when
there is active case management, followed by a self-contained trial in
the rare case that does not settle or is not otherwise terminated. After
the pleadings in civil law countries, the judge decides what evidence
he or she needs and proceeds to request documents and interrogate
witnesses in person, summarizing the testimony in writing. The civil
law judge's role is to decide the case on as limited an issue as neces-
sary. As Professor Langbein argued in his provocative article, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, the German judge has no need
6. For a description of the discovery amendments through 1998 and their background, see
Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux. 39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998).
7. For a scathing attack on American discovery by an American lawyer, see Loren Kieve.
Discovery Reform. 77 A.B.A. J. 79 (1991). Here is a representative sample from the article:
'The obvious solution is one the rest of the civilized world (or at least the English and civil law
systems) has long used: No discovery.'" Id. at 81.
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to explore every possible avenue in preparation for trial. He only ex-
plores what he thinks is relevant, and if what he originally thought
would decide the case turns out insufficient to the task, he then turns
to another avenue." The advocates in civil law countries can propose
witnesses to be questioned and questions to be asked, but it is the
judge who does the questioning.
Professor Geoffrey Hazard compares discovery in the United States
and civil law countries this way:
[C]ivil-law litigation proceeds through a series of short hearing ses-
sions-sometimes less than an hour each-focused on development
of evidence. The products of this are then consigned to the case file
until an eventual final stage of analysis and decision. In contrast,
common-law litigation has one or more preliminary or pretrial
stages, and then a trial at which all the evidence is received consecu-
tively, including all "live" testimony.9
Lawyers in civil law countries do not conduct pretrial depositions.
There is also no pretrial document production conducted by the law-
yers. A party can request the court to require the opposing party to
produce a document, but in some civil law systems the opposing party
cannot be compelled to produce a document that will establish liabil-
ity against him, and in others "a party may be compelled to produce a
document [only] when the judge concludes that the document is the
only evidence concerning the point in issue." 10
In 1998, Japan engaged in reform that altered what in the United
States would be called pretrial discovery."' The new code requires
that the plaintiff's complaint be specific about the underlying facts,
and that "[e]vidence ... be itemized and written out according to each
point to be proved." 2 Initially, there are what the Japanese call "ple-
nary" hearings where the judge, with the aid of the parties, attempts
to identify and clarify issues. The judge can order the parties to pro-
duce documents and can also order the inspection of evidence or ex-
amination of witnesses by an expert. 13 There are two aspects of these
preliminary plenary hearings and preparation for them that appear
similar to American discovery. First, each side must submit relevant
8. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure. 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 823
(1985). But cf Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 734 (1987).
9. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid. 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1673
(1998) (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 1682.
11. Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L.
REV. 687, 694 (1998).
12. Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 699-700.
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documents "in advance of the hearing in adequate time for the other
party to make its preparation." 14 Although the provisions in the new
code are rather complicated and require judicial interpretation, it
seems to knowledgeable observers that many more documents are
now discoverable than under the previous procedure. 15 A party can
ask the court to order the opposing side to "clarify the documents'
titles and contents, but there is no direct penalty if the holder does not
follow this order."1 6 Second, "Each party may, during the course of
the litigation, submit a written inquiry to the other party, asking for
answers to questions that are necessary to prepare the inquiring
party's case. A duty of cooperation is imposed on the parties in litiga-
tion." 1 7 Once again though, "there is no direct penalty" for noncom-
pliance. 18 "Thus, the success of this system depends largely on the
parties' sincere cooperation." 19 After the plenary hearings, there is a
concentrated examination system, more akin to the American trial,
with the witnesses examined by both parties. 20
In some ways, the civil litigation systems of England and other com-
mon law countries are closer to that of the United States. When it
comes to pretrial discovery, though, we are still substantially different,
even after far-reaching procedural reform in England in 1999. In
common law countries, including England, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, South Africa, and India, the lawyers develop the evidence as
opposed to the court. After preliminary or pretrial stages, the evi-
dence is received in what is usually one continuous trial. Before the
1999 procedural reforms in England and other common law countries
such as Canada and Australia, document production rules were based
on the English Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.21 Parties were obli-
gated to make relevant documents available to the opposition, includ-
ing documents that may lead to relevant evidence. This was similar to
the scope of discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b),
both before and after the 2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules.
But as Professor Hazard explained, a number of other aspects of En-
glish procedure and culture resulted in the English interpreting the
14. Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
15. In addition to Kojima. see Toshiro M. Mochizuki. Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties' Ex-
panded Access to Documentary Evidence under the New Japanese Code of Civil procedure. 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 285 (1999).
16. Kojima, supra note 11. at 703.
17. Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 701-02.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 706-07.
21. See Hazard. supra note 9. at 1677-78.
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scope of permissible document requests in a considerably narrower
manner than in the United States.22 Hazard particularly emphasizes
the requirement for more specific and comprehensive fact pleading in
other common law countries and tying permissible document discov-
ery to relevance of what has been pleaded. 23 He summarizes:
It would appear that, in our sister common law countries, the com-
bination of specific pleading, the short time limit imposed for docu-
ment production, and the definition of the obligation to produce set
forth in the general rule results in considerably narrower response
in the way of document production than that to which we have be-
come accustomed in this country.24
Hazard also suggests that a comparison of discovery in other common
law countries and in the United States should take into account the
custom in the former of not bringing suits unless the claimant, without
further discovery, can establish a prima facie case.25 In a 1998 article,
the general counsel for the Financial Services Authority, the financial
regulatory agency in England, reported that there was "no pre-trial
oral stage of any kind" in his country. 26
In April 1999, the courts in the United Kingdom underwent what
has been called a "sea change" in their civil procedure. 27 Lord Woolf,
the Master of the Rolls, had been appointed to chair a special commit-
tee to examine the British civil litigation system. He concluded that
English civil litigation was slow, complex, expensive, and unrespon-
sive. The new reform procedure highlights extensive case manage-
ment and significant factual and legal research that lawyers must do
before filing a case, with severe penalties for filing frivolous writs.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1681. But cf Paul Michalik. Justice in Crisis: England and Wales, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECIIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 118. 125-26 (Adrian A.S. Zucker-
man ed., 1999) (stating "[tihis process of locating, reviewing. listing, inspecting, and copying
documents can be extremely time-consuming. especially in major commercial cases where there
may be rooms full of potentially relevant files"). Michalik also summarizes portions of the
Woolf Report of the Review Body on Civil Justice (Cm. 394. 1988), which paints a less favorable
review of English pre-trial restraint:
Traditionally, the English system allowed parties to control the pace and extent of liti-
gation, especially at the pre-trial stage. with minimal judicial supervision. As a result.
parties have been free to subvert the available procedures to serve their own personal
ends. This has engendered an unduly partisan, combative litigation culture. The com-
plexities in the rules have given lawyers and litigants ample opportunities to indulge in
wasteful, costly practices.
Id. at 152.
25. See Hazard. supra note 9, at 1681-82.
26. London Attorneys Explain Their Legal System. CORP. LEGAL TIMES. Feb. 1998, at 40.
27. Jason Curriden. Woolf Reforms rarget Inefficiency and Inequity in UK Court System. IN-
SIDE LITIG., JuIy 1999, at 1.
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Under the new rules, the complaining party must first mail a Letter of
Protocol to the defendant that includes "a detailed account of the ac-
cusations being made and a thorough summary of the evidence the
claimant has against the defendant. '2 8 If the defendant disputes the
case, it must state why and give details of the supporting evidence. If
the claimant remains unsatisfied, it may file a petition. Unlike the
past, where only bareboned allegations were required, "the new writs
must be full of details and supporting materials, including relevant
documents, photographs, sworn testimonials, and reports from
experts. "29
Cases are assigned to one of three tracks: small claims, cases involv-
ing five thousand to fifteen thousand pounds, and cases involving over
fifteen thousand pounds. The third category of high stakes cases have
extensive case management, including court determination of propor-
tionate and reasonable fees. Each side is required within weeks to
produce all documents and the names of witnesses that they believe
are relevant to the litigation, whether it helps or hurts their argument.
Much testimony will be restricted to written reports. In limited situa-
tions, such as when a witness is unlikely to be available for trial, par-
ties can apply to the court for permission to take oral depositions. If
this limited right to an oral deposition is granted, the court decides
whether a judge will preside over the deposition, or whether "an ex-
aminer of the court" or "such other person as the court appoints" will
preside.3  The head of litigation of a national firm in the United King-
dom stated that the firm now spends "a lot more time early in the case
thinking about how the case will play out." 3 1 She added: "The system
before was a battle of the wallets .... Whichever client had the deep-
est pockets had the definite advantage in litigation. You could have
mountains of discovery. '32 This would suggest that the reforms are
having some beneficial effects. 33
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPARTMENT. CIVIL PROCFDURER RULES, RULES & PRAC-IICE Di-
RECILrONS, Parts 26.1, 31, available at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/procrules-fin/contents/parts/
part26.htm (last visited Feb. 25. 2002).
31. See Curriden. supra note 27. at 2.
32. Id. at 5.
33. LoRD WOOLF. ACCESS TO JUSTICE-FINAL REPORr: FINAL REPORT LO THE LORD CHAN-
CELLOR ON THE CIviL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENOLAND & WALES 105-06 (1996). In Lord Woolf's
discussion of discovery of documents, which he requested to be renamed "disclosure," he recom-
mended that the extent of discovery be proportional to the case. He identified four categories of
documents that, prior to his report. were required to be disclosed: (1) parties' own documents
that "they rely upon in support of their contentions:' (2) "adverse documents of which a party is
aware" and which "adversely affect his own case or support another party's case:" (3) "docu-
ments which do not fall within categories (I) or (2) but are part of the 'story' or background" of
20021
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It would be a mistake to conclude that pretrial discovery in the
United States is totally different from other countries. We have seen
that there is document production and what sounds like mandatory
disclosure elsewhere. In some of the other systems, parties can seek
permission from the court, usually only in a limited number of circum-
stances, to take oral depositions.3 4 Japan now permits what appear to
be pretrial interrogatories. "In 1988, the Netherlands adopted a new
Evidence Act affording some opportunities for discovery. ' 35 Active
case management in the United States, including early control of dis-
covery in some courts, begins to resemble the judicial control exerted
in civil law countries. Nonetheless, the number of discovery mecha-
nisms available to the American lawyer as a matter of right, the de-
gree of party control over discovery, the extent to which liberal
the case: and (4) documents that may "lead to a train of inquiry enabling a party to advance" its
own case or damage its opponent's case. Id. at 124. Lord Woolf proposed that fast track cases
would be limited to categories (1) and (2), which he described as "standard disclosure." while
exceptional cases would be permitted "extra disclosure," as described in categories (3) and (4).
Id. Extra disclosure will only be permitted upon the issuance of a court order. The court must
be satisfied that the extra disclosure will be necessary to do justice, and that "the cost of such
disclosure would not be disproportionate to the benefit" nor would a party's ability to continue
the litigation be impaired by the order. Id. at 125. Lord Woolf made no mention of depositions
in his report. neither mentioning the number of depositions taken nor recommending any limita-
tions or changes to the established practice. Id.
34. In Canada, for example, where depositions are called "examinations for discovery," there
is only the automatic right to examine each individual party and one representative of each
corporate party. Steven R. Schoenfeld et al., Understanding Litigation in Canada, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 16, 2001, at S8. These oral examinations are essentially the same as a deposition in the
United States. except that in some provinces witnesses may refuse to answer questions that are
objected to on the basis of relevance until the witnesses are ordered to answer them by the court.
Id. Unlike the United States, there is no right to depose non-parties. and most provinces do not
permit non-party oral discovery without leave of court. Id. The party seeking the non-party
deposition has the burden to show that: (1) the information cannot be obtained from a person
whom the requesting party is entitled to examine: (2) it would be unfair to force the requesting
party to proceed to trial without the examination: and (3) the examination would not cause
unreasonable expense to the other party. or be unfair to the non-party. In most provinces, a
party must seek a court order. Id.
35. There is no automatic discovery of documents under Netherlands law. However, there are
various provisions that enable a party to obtain documents in which it has a legitimate interest
from opposing or third parties. A party awaiting litigation seeking inspection or production of
an authentic instrument to which it has not been a party may review the instrument if the court
feels that there exist grounds for production. If a person has a special interest in documents that
are at the disposal of another person, he/she may demand a copy of it at his/her own expense.
The court decides, if necessary, on the way inspection is to be arranged or copies or extracts are
to be produced. Public records are available for discovery without court order. See HEBLY, THE
NETHERLANDS Civii EVIDENCE ACT 1988, at 16-18 (1992): Richard L. Marcus, Retooling Ameri-
can Discovery for the Twentv-First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 153, 185 (1999) (citing HEBLY. supra). See also Edward F. Sherman, The Evolution of
American Civil Trial Process Towards Greater Congruence with Continental Trial Practice, 7 TUL.
J. INr'L & COMp. L. 125 (1999) (drawing comparisons between American and continental civil
procedure systems).
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discovery in the United States has become what almost looks like a
constitutional right, 36 and the massive use of discovery of all kinds in a
substantial number of cases surely sets us apart.
Of course, accusing one of being "nuts" can have a third meaning,
distinguished from intense attraction or difference. It can mean
"crazy" or "irrational," clearly wrong or mistaken. In this sense, I
suppose that much of the world does think we are nuts when it comes
to civil discovery. A consistent theme of those comparing American
discovery to that in other countries is that the latter avoid and con-
demn discovery "fishing expeditions." Here are a few examples. An
Australian jurist in condemning "fishing expedition[s]" explained
"that a person who has no evidence that fish of a particular kind are in
a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the purpose of finding out
whether there are any there or not."' 37 "Most countries," another
commentator explains:
do not have the liberal discovery rules of the United States and
many are actively hostile to discovery within their country. Civil
law countries in particular frequently view discovery as an infringe-
ment of sovereignty. Some countries have required attorneys seek-
ing a business visa to affirm that they are not going to the country
for the purpose of taking a deposition. Canada and Great Britain
view much United States discovery as a fishing expedition. 3s
In commenting on discovery in the Westinghouse Uranium litigation,
"the House of Lords regarded the US [sic] discovery process as being
a fishing expedition and thus an abuse of court process. ' 39 Another
article describes the failure of the United States Supreme Court to
limit American discovery on foreign soil to that permitted by the
Hague Convention, notwithstanding our country's adoption of that
Convention. It describes the French countermoves through blocking
statutes and the French "narrow" discovery rules that "prevent 'fish-
ing expeditions' for evidence for use in United States legal proceed-
ings." 40 The authors add: "What the French fear most is not the
revelation of damaging material but rather the occurrence of "fishing
36. See Hazard, supra note 9, at 1694: David J. Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the
Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 Am. J. COMi'. L. 745 (1986).
37. Hooker Corp. v. Australia (1985) 80 F.L.R. 94, 104 (Austl.) (quoting Associated Domin-
ions Assurance Soc'v Pty. Ltd. v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1952) 72 N.S.W. 250, 254
(Austl.)). See also Hazard. supra note 9. at 82.
38. E. Charles Routh. ALI-ABA, Dispute Resolution - Representing the Foreign Client in Ar-
bitration and Litigation. in GOING INTERNATIONAil, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS TRANSAcTIONs 592 (1996).
39. Warren Pengilley, United States Trade and Antitrust Laws: A Stud' of lnternational Legal
Imperialism from Sherman to Helms Burton, 6 COriM'i -HTrON & CONSUMER L.J. 208 (1999).
40. Vincent Mercier & Drake D. McKenney, Obtaining Evidence in France t)r Use in United
States Litigation. 2 TUL. J. INr'L & CowP. L. 91, 95 (1994).
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expeditions,' i.e., any request that is not for a clearly identified
document.
4 1
The foreign critics of American discovery say very little about why
"fishing expeditions" are bad. Fishermen, after all, see such excur-
sions in a positive light. I suppose the negative connotations include
wasted time and expense for both private individuals and the court
system, invasions of privacy, and the unfairness of forcing defendants
to expend resources when plaintiffs do not have advance information
of liability.
But this continual use of the phrase "fishing expeditions" to con-
demn American discovery with little analysis gives pause. What
neither foreign commentators on American discovery nor homegrown
conservative critics tend to mention is the extensive empirical research
in our country demonstrating that in many American civil cases, often
approaching fifty percent, there is no discovery, and in most of the
remainder of the cases there is remarkably little. A study by the Fed-
eral Judicial Center summarizes the findings of empiricists: "[T]he
typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs that are
proportionate to the stakes of litigation, and ... discovery generally-
but with notable exceptions-yields information that aids in the just
disposition of cases."'42
This does not mean that our use of discovery resembles most other
countries-it does not. Nor does it mean that we do not have discov-
ery abuse-we do. One cannot read Wayne Brazil's articles, including
empirical data and vivid descriptions, without being convinced that in
41. Id. at 118.
42. Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under
the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998). A 1997 survey by the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) concluded that about half of the average district court's civil
docket would be unlikely to have any discovery. Id. at 549 tbl.6. Similarly, the RAND Institute
for Civil Justice concluded that in 38% of the civil cases filed in federal court, lawyers conducted
no discovery. In a study of five state trial courts, the National Center for State Courts found that
42% of general civil litigation cases did not have recorded discovery. Susan Keilitz et al., Is Civil
Discovery in the State Courts Out of Control?. 1993 ST. CT. J. 9. The FJC study also concluded
that for the cases in which discovery was conducted, the median expenditure per side for discov-
ery, as a percentage of the stakes in the litigation, was a mere 3%. At the ninety-fifth percentile,
the expenditures were 32% of the amount at stake. Id. See also THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS. AND PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 17
tbl.6, 18 tbl.8, 38 tbl.29 (1997). There are now several articles that use empirical data to expose
the myths about American discovery and demonstrate that it is used a good deal less than many
assume or assert. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves" A Little More: Consider-
ing the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229 (1999): Linda S. Mullenix. Discovery in
Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Un-
founded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1432-42 (1994) (analyzing social science findings by
the FJC, the Baltimore Discovery case study. and the National Center for State Courts study).
[Vol. 52:299
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a substantial subset of cases, in the neighborhood of five to ten per-
cent, or possibly even fifteen percent, lawyers abuse the discovery
rules both by over-discovery and by hiding and obfuscating informa-
tion.43 There is frequent distortion of evidence, as a result of lawyer
interventions including the type of witness coaching that is forbidden
in other countries. But even here, it is important to put American
discovery in a larger perspective that includes the nature of our gov-
ernment, the composition of the bench and bar, the constitutional
right to a jury, methods of lawyer compensation, ideology and beliefs
about power, the degree of safety provided by the welfare state, atti-
tudes about government regulation, and the place of discovery in the
overall procedural scheme. In short, to label our system as one that
wrongly permits "fishing expeditions" is to miss much of the point.
Our discovery mechanisms are not so irrational when seen in con-
text. Let me sketch out some examples.4 4 Consider our historic dis-
trust of concentrated power. Our doctrines of federalism and
separation of powers, the right to a jury trial, and the adversary sys-
tem, including party control, reflect our historic distrust of residing
power in one person or limited groups. We do not think that judges
would ferret out negative aspects of our opponent's case and positive
information to prove our own claims or defenses with the same moti-
vation and intensity that self-interest propels. Perhaps if we had more
experience with career judges, elevated as the result of performance
based on objective criteria, as opposed to politically-appointed or
elected judges, we would have more confidence in turning over dis-
covery to the judiciary. But one must be cautious here. Professor
Marcus quotes Professor Damaska on the European experience:
As Professor Damaska has recognized, Continental civil procedure
exhibits "a considerable degree of tolerance-almost insouciance,
to common law eyes-for the incompleteness of evidentiary mate-
rial." Assigning fact gathering to the judge does not solve this prob-
lem-, "the protagonist who tends to monopolize fact gathering-the
43. See, e.g.. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discover': Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Princi-
pal Problems, and Abuses, 198(0 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789: Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B.
FoUND. RES. J. 217: Wayne D. Brazil. The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change. 37 VAND. L. REv. 1295 (1978). See also Stephen N. Subrin. Fudge
Points and Thin Ice in Discoverv Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure.
46 FLA. L. REv. 27. 45 nn.123-24 (1994).
44. 1 do not claim that this is original. Indeed. Geoffrey Hazard and Richard Marcus. each of
whose work I greatly respect, have explained in some detail how our discovery is an integral part
of a much more interconnected legal and civil process, and how difficult it would be to change
our wide-open discovery. without disturbing other aspects of our legal process and general cul-
ture that are unlikely to change. See Hazard. supra note 9. at 1682-93: Marcus. supra note 35. at
188-90. 194-98.
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judge-is not really very energetic or resolute in his probing. His
exercise of his near-monopoly power to develop evidence seems
lazy." 45
The relative proportion of lawyers and judges in our country also
helps dictate American discovery practices. There are approximately
a million lawyers in the United States. 46 In 1998, there were 9065
state judges of courts of general jurisdiction. 47 At the federal district
court level, there were 642 authorized life tenured judgeships and 436
magistrate judges. 48 In addition, there were 337 senior status district
judges. 49 This means we have approximately one hundred lawyers for
each judge who presides over a court of general jurisdiction. Also,
judges are increasingly preoccupied with criminal matters. 50 Whether
it is a good idea or not, the judiciary does not have the personnel to
replace lawyers as having the primary responsibility for pretrial dis-
covery.51 Nor is it likely that state or federal legislators will soon dras-
tically increase the funding for the judiciary.
In the United States, civil litigation plays a more substantial role in
the governmental and societal structure than in most other countries.
Alexis de Tocqueville noted in the 1830s how many hotly contested
political issues end up in the United States courts.52 These issues are
frequently, if not usually, raised by private litigants in civil litigation,
as opposed to law enforcement by the state itself. A recent article
about the Japanese legal system emphasizes how unusual the United
States is in utilizing civil litigation, often through the tort system, to
45. Marcus, supra note 35. at 193 (citing Mirjan R. Damaska, The Uncertain Fate of Eviden-
tiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental Experiments. 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 839. 843-44
(t997): MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 122 (1986);
MIRJAN R. DAMASKA. EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 114 (1997)).
46. Richard L. Marcus. Malaise of the Litigation Superpower, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 80 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed.. 1999)
Ihereinafter CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS].
47. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE. STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 9.
at tbl.3 (1998). available at http://www.cjp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf (last visited Nov, 25,
2002).
48. Id. at 17, tbl.3 (exploring the 1999 statistics).
49. See Judith Resnik. The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Resources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations. 86 GEO. L.J. 2589. 2604 n.84 (1998).
50. Renee M. Landers. Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on the Mission of the Federal
Courts, 46 HASTINcS L.J. 1255. 1259-60 (1985).
51. "The whole system of civil adjudication would ground to a virtual halt if the courts were
forced to intervene in even a modest percentage of discovery transactions." Marcus, supra note
35, at 187 (citing In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig.. 108 F.R.D, 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
52. "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later
turn into a judicial one." ALEXIS DE ITOi OIJEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer
& M. Lerner eds.. 1966).
310 [Vol. 52:299
DISCOVERY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
enforce social norms.53 In this article, the author notes that in Japan,
after private individuals sought to enforce environmental and anti-dis-
crimination laws through civil litigation, the government, particularly
"the entrenched bureaucracy," sought to curtail private enforcement
so that the state could retain its power "as the appropriate enforcer of
legal norms. ' 54 Perhaps a truer comparison of the utilization of dis-
covery in the United States would be between our civil discovery and
the methods used in other countries to gain information, through
force or otherwise, by the police, prosecutors, and administrative
agencies in their attempt to enforce laws. It may well be that other
countries permit so little discovery because the bulk of their civil cases
are like the routine cases in the United States that engender modest
discovery.55
Broad discovery seems critical in many situations in which private
individuals in the United States use civil litigation to enforce rights.
This is particularly true in such cases as civil rights, products liability,
securities, and antitrust, in which evidence to make a prima facie case
frequently resides in the files and minds of the defendants. In these
lawsuits, it would often be very difficult, if not impossible, for the
plaintiff to plead her facts or evidence with particularity in the com-
plaint, as is required in the pleading rules of other countries. The lack
of precise pleading means that the defendant also frequently needs
extensive discovery. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
drawn the connection between notice pleading and liberal discovery.
It is instructive that the three main cases in which the Supreme Court
has insisted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call only for
simplified, notice pleading all involve civil rights and all speak to the
important place of discovery in the overall procedural scheme. 56 And,
of course, settlement negotiations and deciding summary judgment
motions, so important in American procedure given the dearth of de-
tail required in the complaint and the consequent difficulty of ob-
taining a dismissal for failure to state a claim, are highly reliant on
53. Carl F. Goodman. The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan's Changing View Towards
Civil Litigation. 32 LAw & POLY INI'L Bus. 769 (2001).
54. Id. at 773. For a comparison of the Japanese and American views of law enforcement with
descriptions of discrimination and environmental cases, as well as others, see id. at 772.
55. Professor Linda Silberman made this suggestion to me after the Clifford Conference.
56. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957): Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-
gence and Coordination Unit. 507 U.S. 163. 168-69 (1993) ("In the absence of such an amend-
ment [of Rule 9(b)]. federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."): Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A.. 122 S. Ct. 992. 997-98 (2002) (holding that -[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts
and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie
case in a particular case").
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extensive discovery. In short, it would be difficult to eliminate exten-
sive discovery in United States civil litigation without also changing
the relative places of civil litigation, lawyers, judges, and juries in our
culture and the relative roles of pleading, discovery, summary judg-
ment, and other elements of procedure. 57 The rules and the culture
are interrelated in complex ways that would be very difficult to disen-
tangle, even if such rearrangements were deemed desirable.
So upon closer look, the place of discovery in the United States is
not nuts,58 but just dramatically different based on how we view the
roles of government, the individual, civil litigation, and the constituent
parts of the procedural system. In fact, there are occasions when the
citizens of other countries would be more justly served by permitting
portions of the American discovery practice, such as pretrial deposi-
tions. The current Council Draft of the American Law Institute/
UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, a
project with legal advisers from many countries, permits depositions
upon order of the court.59 In the introduction to the Draft, the au-
thors describe the limited right of document discovery and depositions
in civil law countries and add: "However, in a modern legal system
there is a growing practical necessity-if one is serious about justice-
to permit document discovery to some extent and, at least in some
cases, deposition of key witnesses. '60
Whether or not the rest of the world draws closer to the United
States model of discovery,61 we are closer to other countries in how
discovery is actually utilized and in our developing views of the place
of discovery in civil litigation than is at first apparent. As I mentioned
earlier, we have never had much discovery in the United States in the
57. For instance, the right to jury trial makes it more difficult to have the discontinuous hear-
ings that include evidence-gathering, which are a hallmark of civil law adjudication. Langbein's
suggestion that judges could conduct pretrial discovery, while at the same time maintaining jury
trials, runs into the conceptual and practical problems of turning discovery over to judges that I
have just discussed. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also Gross. supra note 8.
58. Here, of course, I am using the term "nuts" in the sense of crazy or clearly mistaken or
wrong.
59. PRINCIPLES ANt) RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 22.1 (ALI/UNIDROIT.
Discussion Draft No. 3. 2002).
60. Id. at 12. See also G.L. Davies. Civil Justice Reform in Australia. in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS. supra note 46. at 177 (complaining about the abusive use of document discovery in some
cases, while "in the majority of cases which turn substantially on oral evidence, each party may
take the other by surprise").
61. Professor Marcus notes that the experience of the drafting of the International Commerce
Commission new RULES OF ARBITRATION. and the preliminary draft of the American Law Insti-
tute's TRANSNATIONAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, along with other indications, make it
"hard to see that the rest of the world has moved much toward discovery of the American
mold." Marcus, supra note 35, at 185-86.
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vast bulk of cases.62 Almost all of the amendments to the federal dis-
covery rules during the past two decades have been in the direction of
restraining discovery: discovery and pretrial conferences, judges and
lawyers encouraged to view discovery in terms of "proportionality" of
the stakes involved, limitations on the number and length of deposi-
tions and interrogatories, and sanctions for obstructive behavior. 63
I want to close by suggesting that there are economic, social, intel-
lectual, and cultural factors that, in the long haul, may have an even
greater influence than the rules themselves in drawing the American
discovery experience away from the "fishing expeditions" so deplored
by others. Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana was, in the first third of
the twentieth century, the major opponent to the Enabling Act that
empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate the uniform federal
procedural rules. 64 I am reminded of a letter he wrote friends upon
62. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
63. It may seem strange that in the United States the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been amended in so many ways to control and curtail discovery, while at the same time empirical
data shows that in most cases there does not appear to be discovery abuse. Several reasons have
been proposed including that the drafters of rule amendments do not sufficiently take into ac-
count empirical data. In drafting the 1993 amendments to Rule 26, "there was little relevant
empirical evidence and, indeed, the [Advisory] Committee repeatedly rejected pleas to stay its
hand pending the evaluation of experience under local rules." Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance
and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium. 59 BROOK. L. REX'. 841. 845 (1993)
(footnote omitted). See also Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil
Rulemaking. 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455. 458 (1993) (citing Linda S. Mullenix. Hope Over
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795.
810 (1991) (stating that "there is virtually no empirical study of the current practice of such
informal discovery, the efficacy of such experiences. or the results of informal discovery") (foot-
note omitted). Additionally. critics assert that the business community and especially insurance
companies have painted an unduly negative picture of American civil litigation and discovery,
and that the judges themselves are apt to concentrate on and be influenced by the big cases that
consume so much of their time. For the judicial role in misperceiving what goes on in typical
cases. see Marc Galanter. Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Societ'. 31 UCLA L.
REX. 4 (1983): Mullenix. supra note 42. at 1397-1410 (summarizing some of the growing litera-
ture on the myths surrounding discovery and explaining how the myths about discovery abuse
were promulgated and spread). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel. Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whip-
ping Post: 7he Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform," 64 LAW & CON TiEMP. PROBS. 197
(2001): Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovers Abuse: The Sequel. 39 B.C.
L. REV. 683 (1998). Also, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are trans-substantive in the sense
that the same rules are available for all types of cases. William W. Schwarzer. In Defense of
"Automatic Disclosure in Discovery." 27 GA. L. REV. 655. 656 (1993). Consequently. if the draft-
ers want to amend rules to control or curtail discovery in those cases in which there is more
likely to be abuse, their net also covers the routine cases since, for the most part, they have been
unwilling or unable to draft substance-specific rules. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure
in Discovery - The Rush to Reform. 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 39 (1992).
64. See, e.g.. Stephen B. Burbank. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934. 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
11)63-65. 1081-95 (1982): Stephen N. Subrin. How Equis
, 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective. 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 996-98 (1987).
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his return from a trip to England. He had become convinced that the
habits of restraint of the bench and bar in England at the time and the
overall legal culture had a good deal more to do with how their litiga-
tion was conducted than rules or statutes. 65
Let me mention three powerful influences that encourage lawyers
in the United States to be more restrained and focused in their use of
discovery. I do not know enough about the legal cultures in other
countries to speculate on whether similar cultural currents are at work
elsewhere. Because there is considerably less discovery abroad than
in the United States, there is less reason to cut back. In the United
States, business clients are exerting a powerful pressure counter to the
expansive discovery excursions of the past. There is evidence that
business clients have expanded their own in-house legal departments
in order to control fees, and they are monitoring the fees charged by
litigators to a much larger extent than previously. This is particularly
true of insurance companies, who, much to the pain of defense coun-
sel, want detailed explanations of the cost of each litigation step for
which they will be charged. 66 There is also reason to believe that the
utilization of hourly rates, which permit legal bills to be greatly in-
creased by the use of multiple attendees at painfully long depositions
and other fee-enhancing techniques, are being curtailed by the use of
preset fees. 67
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is also having an impact on
litigation in the United States in multiple ways.68 Most obvious is
65. Letter from Thomas Walsh to Mr. and Mrs. Hutchens, reprinted in THOMAS J. WALSH
PAPERS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Oct. 5. 1925) Box 281, Judiciary File (concluding that "it is the
habits of our bar that need reforming, not the laws under which they act-). See also Subrin.
supra note 64. at 997-98. My former student, Thomas Main. has recently described how both
state and federal appellate judges interpret the same words in procedural rules differently per-
haps depending on the legal climate at the time the decisions are rendered. Thomas 0. Main.
Procedural Uniformity and The Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in
Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 46 VILL. L. REv. 311
(2001). Professor Jeffrey Stempel mentioned to me. in discussing my ideas for this paper. that
underlying modern literary criticism and deconstruction thought is the notion that the meaning
of language is contingent on context.
66. See, e.g., Robert 1. Weil, Insurance Companies and Their Lawyers-The Cost Squeeze, 32
DEE. L.J. 391 (1983): Andrew Blum. Insurers' Cutbacks Hit Firms. NAT'L L.J.. Nov. 22. 1993, at
1: WILLIAM G. Ross. THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BAsED BILING 59, 113-24
(1996). See also Bryant Garth. From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with
the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931. 950-53 (1994) (discussing increased com-
petition to attract corporate clients and the increased sophistication of clientele).
67. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud. Time and Money: Discovery Leads to
Hourly Billing. 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91. 164 n.289: Darlene Ricker. The Vanishing Hourly Fee,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 66-67.
68. This paragraph draws heavily on a paper I recently delivered at a conference at the Wil-
liam Boyd School of Law. University of Nevada. Las Vegas, Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist
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binding arbitration, which (unfairly, in my view) often forces employ-
ees and consumers into dispute resolution processes that permit little
or no discovery. 69 Perhaps less obvious is the growing use of media-
tion, frequently at earlier stages of the litigation, before a good deal of
discovery has occurred. Some lawyers are using mediators to help
them decide what discovery is needed in order to either settle the
case, or if that fails, get it ready for trial. In the United States, only
two to four percent of commenced cases are tried;70 the majority of
cases settle. There is a growing awareness that settlement, whether
through mediation or unaided negotiation, will often turn on nonlegal
variables.71 This is not to say that the law and facts are unimportant in
mediations or negotiations. The written and oral overviews at media-
tion contain relevant law applied to relevant facts. But the very na-
ture of a mediation, with the mediator often asking pointed questions
of both parties, forces a type of focus on the most relevant informa-
tion that makes it obvious that prolonged discovery, often providing
little of genuine importance, can be wasteful and even distracting.
The ivory tower permits me to suggest one other cultural factor that
is a bit harder to articulate and even more speculative in its effect on
discovery. Almost all of scientific and intellectual thought in the last
century pointed in the direction of the uncertainty of our knowledge
and the interconnectedness of what we think are "facts. ' 72 Modern
and post-modern thought suggests the impossibility of ascertaining
objective truth, and science teaches the hidden mysteries of cause and
effect. The environmentalists tell us that a butterfly flapping its wings
Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEv. L.J. (forthcoming
Winter 2002-2003).
69. See, e.g.. Jean R. Sternlight. Panacea or Corporate Fool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration. 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637. 683-84 (1996). See also ALLAN SCO Lr
RAU Fr AL.. PROCESSES OF DisPuTrE RESOLUTION 600-01 (3d ed. 2002).
70. The overall completed state trial rate was estimated at 2 .9 % of all terminations for 1991-
92: the federal rate wias 3.7%. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Fed-
eral Courts: A Statistical Portrait. 19 SEATTLLE U. L. REv. 433. 440-42 tbl.3 (1996). In 2000. only
2.2% of federal civil cases reached trial (5,780 trials of 259,234 total civil cases terminated).
ADILMNISTRAT1VE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS. JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATFS
COIRTS - 2000 ANNUAL REPORT O- THE DIRFECTOR 159 tbl.C-4. available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/jublbus2000/contents.html (last visited Nov. 15. 2002).
71. A classic examination of the variables involved in settlement is H. LAURENCE Ross, SET-
TLED OUT OF COURT (1980). The mediation literature is replete with examples of how issues
that are not illuminated bv discovery, such as the continuing relationship of the parties. influence
settlement.
72. 1 have previously discussed modern and post-modern thought and its impact on litigation
jurisprudence in Stephen N. Subrin. On Thinking About a Description ol a Countrv's Civil Pro-
cedure, 7 TUL. J. IaT'l & COMP. L. 139, 144-48 (1999). 1 find WILLIAM R. EVERDELL. THE FIRST
MODERNS (1997). particularly helpful in understanding modern and post-modern thought.
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in Brazil influences the wind currents hundreds of miles away. 73 Any
of us who prepares lawsuits knows that there is often an endless sup-
ply of documents and witnesses, and that further inquiry just might
turn up something slightly, or even greatly, relevant. And now we
have the hidden, never erased traces in the hard drive of computers,
with billions of units of information that might yield a helpful clue.
There is a staggering amount of information that one might bring to
bear on many disputes. At some point, though, comes the realization
that too much information is indigestible. The skillful lawyer realizes
that in order to make the story understandable to others, she will have
to focus her narrative on the most important information, and this is
probably better accomplished earlier rather than later.
The lead article in a recent issue of Litigation, an issue centered on
tactics, is entitled Focusing: When Less is More.74 The author, an asso-
ciate editor of the magazine and a partner in a Philadelphia firm, sug-
gests a change in the direction on how litigators must approach their
task:
The days of leisurely, broad-based discovery that allowed our theo-
ries and strategies to evolve over time as we gradually filled in
pieces of the big picture are becoming history, with both courts and
clients increasing the pressure on us to get to the point quickly.
Courts are competing with each other to clear their dockets, setting
"rocket docket" schedules and imposing rigid limits on discovery. 75
The author mentions the new federal rules' limit on the number of
interrogatories and the seven-hour limit on depositions. She
continues:
The old deposition outlines no longer work. Clients are also losing
patience with protracted litigation. It takes too long and costs too
much. They want the process streamlined, and they want quick re-
sults. The challenge is how to do this without sacrificing thorough-
ness and care. Again, the answer is foCUS.
7 6
She suggests that the lawyer consider her closing statement at the be-
ginning of case preparation and "[e]arly in the case, analyze the claims
and defenses to identify a potentially dispositive issue for summary
73. A research librarian at Northeastern University School of Law. Michelle Pearce. has
found many variations of the oft-used quote about the butterfly in Brazil. Many sources give
credit to the American meteorologist, Edward N. Lorenz. Address at the American Association
for the Advancement of Sciences, Predictability: Does the Flop of a Butterfly's Wings in Brazil
Set Off a Tornado in Texas? (Dec. 29. 1979).
74. Joyce S. Meyers. Focusing: When Less is More. 28 LiTic. 6 (2002).
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
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judgment . . . . Then take focused discovery to establish key undis-
puted facts to support this motion. 77
Client supervision of fees, increased use of ADR, and awareness
that there are no natural cutoffs to information accumulation point in
the same direction as the rule amendments that constrain discovery. I
think it is safe to predict that over time one will find shorter, more
focused discovery "fishing expeditions" by American litigators in
many cases.
But there is one place that the United States remains substantially
different. Government plays a less active role in the United States in
enforcing law and regulating social norms than in other countries, and
the United States provides less of a safety net for its citizens than else-
where, such as not providing national health care. So long as this con-
tinues, civil litigation, usually by private parties, will play a different
and more intense role in the United States than in other countries.
There will continue to be cases in which the stakes are so high for one
or more parties that every shred of potential information will seem
worth exploring. It took years of litigation and discovery to uncover
concealed information in the asbestos and tobacco industries. 78 In an
antitrust case, such as Microsoft, the parties-at least the plaintiffs-
correctly perceive that expansive discovery is critical to the ultimate
77. Id.
78. In early asbestos cases, industry leaders were successful in convincing juries that they
could not have been aware of the health risks of asbestos prior to 1964. PAIJI BRODEUJR, OUT-
RAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 106 (1985). Attorney Karl Asch. upon reviewing the 1974 annual report
of Raysbestos-Manhattan, saw a self-congratulatory reference to a study that Ravsbestos had
commissioned in 1930 in which the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company surveyed all of its
factories for health hazards. Id. at 107-08. The report further mentioned that Raysbestos had
joined with other asbestos products manufacturers in the mid-1930s in funding research pro-
grams on the biological effects of asbestos. Id. When served with discovery requests. Metropoli-
tan Life claimed that thev could not find the papers. Id. at 109. Following a motion to compel.
the insurance company released a report of some surveys that it had performed. Id. Finally.
Asch obtained a subpoena duces tecum ordering then CEO of Ravsbestos to give testimony in
deposition and to bring with him all documents pertaining to working conditions. Id. In that
deposition, one and a half years since the initial request for document production. William Simp-
son revealed that his father's papers were in storage in the company vault at the company's
headquarters. See BRODEUR. supra. at 110. His father. Sumner Simpson was the CEO of Rays-
bestos in the 1930's. In his files. Asch found the "smoking gun" that showed that Raysbestos and
other industry leaders most certainly knew of the hazards of asbestos well before 1964. Id. The
other U.S. asbestos giant. Johns- Mansville. had claimed that they had discarded all correspon-
dence between its officials and Sumner Simpson when they moved corporate headquarters five
years earlier. Id. For descriptions of concealment and ultimate discovery in tobacco litigation,
see PETER PRINGLE. CORNERED: Bi(, TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 138-59 (1998). See also
Michael V. Ciresi et al.. Decades of Deceit: Document Discover' in the Minnesota Tohacco Liti-
gation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. Rev. 477. 479-564 (1999). On the importance of law to deter
wrongdoing by corporations. see THoMAs H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RIJStArD. IN DEFENSE OF
TORi LAW 3-5 (21)).
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outcome. 79 These are situations when discovery restraint will not
make sense.
Large, high stakes cases notwithstanding, I do think we are learning
a sense of discovery restraint that will be more appealing to the rest of
the world. Smallness will look better. Fewer American lawyers will
be likely to spend so large a portion of their professional lives in ware-
houses reading the small print of documents,80 or as the third associ-
ate watching a deposition. Whether more of them will drink espresso
in cafes at a leisurely pace after work while discussing the exquisite
relationship of post-modern thought to depositions is perhaps doubt-
ful-unless they become law professors. 81
79. The deposition testimony ran tens of thousands of pages. Carol B. Swanson, Antitrust
Excitement in the New Millennium: Microsoft, Mergers, and More, 54 OKLA. L. RLv. 285. 318
(2001). "'Eugene Crew. a San Francisco lawyer who is at the hub of the California cases, said
that 12 to 15 witnesses were being deposed each month and that millions of pages of documents
had been gathered." Barnaby J. Feder, Private Suits Put Microsoft At Little Risk. N.Y. TIMES.
July 16. 2001, at Cl. In requesting to delay the hearings on the proposed remedies by at least
four months, Microsoft "accused the states of seeking internal documents that 'are truly breath-
taking in scope,' forcing Microsoft to employ 'a team of 40 lawyers and paraprofessionals work-
ing between 60 and 72 hours a week exclusively on this document production."' Stephen
Labaton, Delay Sought By Microsoft In States' Case. N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 22. 2001, at C2. Big
antitrust cases long precede the Microsoft experience, however. In 19H1. the government's
break-up of Standard Oil involved a record that was "inordinately voluminous, consisting of
twenty-three volumes of printed matter, aggregating about 12.000 pages. containing a vast
amount of confusing and conflicting testimony relating to innumerable, complex, and varied
business transactions, extending over a period of nearly forty years." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 30-31 (1911).
80. They may, though, find themselves more at computers. A recent article in Litigation mag-
azine outlines the many places in computers where the lawyer may hunt relevant data: active
data, embedded data or metadata, replicant data, residual data, back-up data, legacy data. book
marks, cache files, and cookies. James P. Flynn & Sheldon M. Finkelstein. A Primer on "E-vide-
n.c.e.. 28 LiriG. 34. 36-37 (2002). See also Jason Krause. Discovery Channels, 88 A.B.A. J. 48. 50
(2002) (quoting Charles Weeden that "[i]t used to be you'd send young associates out to Brook-
lyn to some vermin-infested, sweltering warehouse to wade through mountains of paper docu-
ments .... Now, if you can put your data in a central database with a powerful enough search
function, you can type in a keyword and get more information than that poor associate in Brook-
lyn ever could.").
81. They might also consider relocating to the Paris office of their firm.
